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possibilities. This openness is shown, for example, in the emergent prop­
erties of life and mind. But, anticipation as openness to possibilities is 
simply contingency. It seems Haught's point is simply that the universe 
has a contingent future. However, Haught seems to want much more 
conveyed by his notion of anticipation, but what exactly is unclear. For 
example, much of what Haught suggests has an Aristotelian flavor in 
each existing thing being drawn to imitate an unmoved mover. This is 
not the kind of theological explanation to which Haught ascribes. Yet, 
there seems little in his notion of anticipation that will help him distin­
guish his conclusions from such an explanation.
One way of understanding Haught's account is as a Plantingian critique 
of evolutionary naturalism from within a process theological approach. 
As such this is an interesting synthesis of divergent approaches to natural 
theology. Whether Haught has moved that critique forward is too complex 
an issue for me to treat in this review. The problems I have tried to identify 
in Haught's account stem from difficulties basic to the natural theological 
enterprise—from where do we obtain our theological concepts, how does 
our theological language contact our everyday experience. Haught's is an 
interesting attempt to deal with these difficulties.
A theism : A  Very Short Introduction, by Julian Baggini. Oxford University 
Press, 2004. Pp. 119. US $9.95 (paperback).
AGNALDO CUOCO PORTUGAL, University of Brasilia, Brazil
It is a short but very provocative book. The aim is to provide atheists with 
a thought organizer and a handy, quick explanation of their ideas for non­
atheists. This ambitious goal of defending a whole worldview in such a 
short book is pursued in six chapters and a conclusion, in addition to some 
references and indications for further reading.
The first and the second chapters are the most important. Chapter one 
is dedicated to a clarification of what atheism is about. Baggini proposes 
that we overcome the prejudice not only that atheism is evil and threaten­
ing, but also that it is essentially a negative position, parasitic on postula­
tions of supernatural/transcendental realities. According to him, there is 
a positive stance that better characterizes the view he is defending, which 
he calls 'atheist physicalism' (p. 6). According to atheist physicalism, only 
the natural world exists, and the stuff of the natural world is essentially 
physical, which means that spirits, souls, and ideas detached from physi­
cal apparatuses are not part of the world. Baggini stresses, however, that 
this position should not be taken as a form of eliminative materialism, 
according to which anything that is not physical or material does not 
exist. Although atheist physicalism postulates that there is only physical 
matter in the universe, it also claims that out of that sole substance come 
minds, beauty, love, and 'the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness 
to human life' (p. 6). In summary, atheism is a form of naturalism and 
physicalism rather than a negative view dedicated to denying religion.
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Chapter two makes a case for atheism in the sense above, claiming that 
atheist physicalism is better supported by evidence, simpler and more co­
herent than the religious worldview. For Baggini, 'evidence is stronger if 
it is available to inspection by more people on repeated occasions; and 
worse if it is confined to the testimony of a small number of people on 
limited occasions' (p. 13). According to him, there is strong evidence in 
favor of atheism while the religious worldview is generally supported 
only by very weak evidence. For him, natural phenomena are all better ex­
plained by naturalism, and things that remain unexplained will probably 
be explained in naturalistic terms rather than by anything supernatural. 
In consequence, since naturalism is the best explanation of all observed 
occurrences, these provide important evidence for atheism (p. 27).
Apart from being supported more by evidence, atheist physicalism is 
also simpler than the religious worldview, since it postulates the existence 
of only the natural world. In addition, it is also more coherent, since 'it has 
everything in the universe fitting into one scheme of being. Those who 
posit a supernatural realm have to explain how this realm and the natural 
one interact and co-exist' (p. 30).
Chapter three is dedicated to an outline of atheist ethics, aiming to show 
not only that morality has nothing to do with God or religion, but also that 
the atheist may be able to act better morally than the religious believer 
since he is not tempted to do something only to avoid God's punishment. 
In addition, there are many examples of important godless moralities, 
such as Aristotelian ethics, consequentialism, and Kant's moral philoso­
phy. As a result, Baggini maintains, there is no reason why atheists should 
be thought of as amoralists.
Chapter four talks about meaning and purpose, challenging the thesis 
that the meaning of life is not a problem for the religious, since God is 
supposed to have created us with a purpose in mind. For Baggini, this 
would just make us into a tool for somebody else's purpose, and would 
not make our lives meaningful for us, since it would not include above 
all our projects, needs, and desires (p. 63). Moreover, Baggini argues, the 
atheist who lives this life can see more purpose in it than those who take it 
as a type of preparation for another one, which would be more meaningful 
(p. 65). Not only would there be no point in doing anything if we had an 
eternity to live, but it is possible to see the following dilemma in the notion 
of after-life: 'either the after-life is recognizably like this life, in which case 
an eternal one does not look very meaningful; or it is not like this life at 
all, in which case it doesn't look like the kind of life we could actually live' 
(p. 70). In sum, for Baggini, life without believing in God or in an after-life 
is not necessarily meaningless or without direction. Rather, he holds, it is 
probably the other way round.
In chapter five there is a brief history of atheism, which attempts to show 
that it is 'part of a progressive story of human culture in which superstition 
is replaced with rational explanation and in which we lose the illusions of 
the supernatural realm and come to learn how to live within the natural 
one' (p. 90). According to Baggini, it all started with pre-Socratic naturalis­
tic theories, which did not postulate anything outside nature itself in order 
to understand how nature worked (p. 74). Pre-Socratic philosophers inau­
gurated naturalism by shifting explanation from mythic stories to rational
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explanation in natural terms. Since naturalism is what defines atheism, 
that remarkable feat by the first philosophers allows us to see atheism 'as 
a part of a wider, progressive story about the development of human in­
tellect and understanding' (p. 78). Although its origins can be traced to 
pre-Socratic philosophy, atheism only became socially relevant after the 
eighteenth century, which was certainly a kind of triumph, Baggini says, 
given the universal diffusion of religion in history and human societies 
(p. 81). As to the link between atheism and twentieth-century totalitarian re­
gimes, the author denies there is any necessary relationship between them 
if we take atheism as naturalism. He accuses religious institutions of not 
having been clearly opposed to those regimes either, and postulates a non­
fundamentalist view of atheism. For him, fundamentalism is a danger both 
in religion and atheism.
Chapter six denies that atheism is necessarily against religion in the 
sense of being violently hostile to religious activities, which is a kind of 
fundamentalism. On the other hand, it is certainly against religion in the 
sense of holding that religious beliefs are generally false (p. 92), a subject 
already dealt with in chapters one and two. In the end, says Baggini, 'reli­
gion will recede not by atheists shouting condemnation, but by the quiet 
voice of reason slowly making itself heard' (p. 107).
The conclusion of the book starts with the admission that many ele­
ments were left out due to the character of a short introduction and the 
focus on defending atheism instead of attacking religion. Another main 
purpose was to dispel a distorted image of atheism as sinister and threat­
ening. For Baggini, this image is probably due to the fact that becoming an 
atheist involves a difficult process of growing up: 'atheism is the throwing 
off of childish illusions and acceptance that we have to make our own way 
in this world' (p. 111).
As mentioned above, the book's main thesis is that atheist physical- 
ism is more rationally grounded than the religious view, where 'rationally 
grounded' is a matter of evidence, coherence and simplicity. The prob­
lem of the rationality of faith has been intensely debated in contemporary 
'analytic' philosophy of religion. One of the leading participants in this 
debate is Alvin Plantinga, according to whose philosophy Baggini's posi­
tion can be characterised as evidentialism in its classic form. According 
to classic evidentialism, a belief is justified only if it is based on evidence 
or is basic itself, in the sense of not being based on anything else. Among 
basic beliefs, according to the classic approach, only self-evident truths 
(like statements from mathematics and logic), incorrigible beliefs (about 
our own mental states), or sensorily evident beliefs can be counted. As a 
result, belief in God would not be basic, since it does not fit in any of these 
categories. And since natural theology's arguments, which start from basic 
beliefs, do not work, belief in God is irrational.
According to Plantinga, classic evidentialism faces two serious diffi­
culties. First, it is inconsistent with the rationality criterion it establishes, 
since its principle is a belief that neither fits in any of the classes of prop­
erly basic beliefs nor is based on an argument. Secondly, if classic eviden- 
tialism is correct, then many of our common beliefs (such as that other 
people have minds like ours, that tables and chairs are objects external to 
our minds or that the world has existed long before we were aware of it)
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are not rational. In view of these problems, it would be better to reject the 
classic evidentialism presupposed by Baggini.
The alternative Plantinga provides suggests a much richer landscape 
than the desert one proposed by atheistic physicalism. In consequence, be­
lief in God, for example, could be basic and thus rational in a wider form 
of evidentialism. Plantinga's proposal includes a theory of knowledge to 
counter the objection of being epistemologically and ontologically per­
missive, that is, of accepting any kind of belief and entity as respectively 
justified and existent. Plantinga puts forward the concept of warrant as a 
parameter to judge the epistemic credentials of a certain proposition. In 
general terms, a belief is warranted if it is produced by a properly func­
tioning apparatus in adequate conditions. In W arranted Christian Belief, 
Plantinga argues not only that the belief in God can be non-trivially ratio­
nally justified (i.e., warranted), but also that the same holds for more spe­
cific Christian beliefs. Although it is not possible to go into the details of 
his approach here, and despite the fact that it is also open to critidsm—as 
all interesting philosophical theories are—what we have expounded here 
seems sufficient to show that Baggini's conclusion that religious beliefs are 
not rational, based on the type of classic evidentialism he defends, is, at 
the least, arrived at too swiftly.
As to Baggini's contention that naturalism is more rational than the reli­
gious view because it is simpler than the latter, consider a thesis by Richard 
Swinburne (Epistemic Justification 2001, chap. 4), according to which sim­
plicity has many facets. In other words, what is simple according to one 
facet can be complex in view of another one. So, naturalism can be simpler 
than the religious world view (the belief that the objects studied by the 
natural sciences constitute only one of the dimensions of reality) because 
it postulates just one type of reality. However, this type of reality will need 
to have much more complex properties than the ones postulated by the 
religious view so that 'the full gamut of phenomena that gives richness to 
human life' may come out of it (p. 6). In addition, the explanation of how 
a plan of intentions and values may come from a biological, chemical and 
physical basis is also more complex than the theistic one, which postulates 
the action of a being whose will is motivated by values.
Baggini's thesis that atheistic naturalism is also more coherent than the 
religious worldview can be questioned as well. According to Plantinga, 
since natural evolution's mechanisms select better fitted behaviours and 
these need not be linked to true beliefs but to the most useful ones from the 
point of view of survival and reproduction, atheistic naturalism cannot 
justify the claim that human cognitive faculties reliably produce true be­
liefs about the world. So, naturalism cannot justifiably assume that these 
faculties reliably provide true beliefs, particularly the most theoretical 
ones, such as the ontological thesis proposed by atheistic physicalism. As 
a result, atheistic naturalism is not only incoherent, but also self-defeating 
since it entails an inability to be justified as a true theory.
Apart from most of the main debate in contemporary philosophy of 
religion, Baggini's book leaves out an important reference regarding the 
meaning of pre-Socratic philosophy to the history of atheism. Werner 
Jaeger's influential The Theology o f  Early Greek Philosophers shows that the 
first pre-Socratic philosophers were not naturalists, but the initiators of
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the metaphysical tradition and of a more sophisticated conception of God. 
For the Milesian School, nature was something alive and divine. Although 
in their alternative to the mythical approach to reality there are some signs 
of atheist naturalism, they can also be seen as those who first proposed the 
theistic metaphysical concept of God. The beginning of the rational tradi­
tion, far from disposing entirely with the concept of God, was strongly 
based on it. So, belief in God does not need to be taken as contradictory 
to the pursuit of scientific discovery. In many cases and for many people, 
including important scientists in the past and present, it can actually be a 
meaningful pre-condition.
In short books with ambitious aims, missing points like the ones indicated 
above are almost inevitable. This flaw is well counter-balanced by a provoca­
tive, enjoyable style of presenting the ideas, and a good overview of the main 
atheistic arguments. In a book of philosophy, an engaging tone is generally 
an important quality. Like all short introductions, Baggini's book runs the 
risk of treating its subject superficially. This is not a defect when it assumes its 
role of being just a starting point for the discussion of a controversial theme. 
The problem is that atheism is not subjected by him to any questioning in 
its own right, as if it were immune to numerous criticisms that have been 
made to it. In other words, it is doubtful whether this kind of introductory 
text should be designed as a sort of intellectual defence artillery for atheists 
(or for religious believers). A more neutral approach, dedicated to showing 
the pros and cons of the debate involving atheism, would be more adequate. 
Although it is not contrary to the alleged open-mindedness of the atheis­
tic position defended by Baggini, the apologetic approach chosen sounds 
a little strange, if not naive, and smacks a bit of advertising in many parts. 
Considering theoretical debate the main function of a book of philosophy 
(even a short one), and given the non-fundamentalist perspective adopted 
by the author, this work should be recommended to the religious believer as 
a means of fine-tuning his own beliefs in view of other perspectives, rather 
than as a handbook to help the atheist maintain peace of mind.
Rethinking H um an Nature: A  Christian M aterialist A lternative to the Soul, by 
Kevin J. Corcoran. Baker Academic, 2006. Pp. 152. $18.99 (paperback).
DAVID VANDER LAAN, Westmont College
Rethinking H um an N ature is an effort to bring the constitution view of per­
sons to an audience of philosophy and theology students, as well as lay- 
people who are eager for an intellectual workout. The constitution view, 
Corcoran argues, is a viable middle ground between dualism and what 
he calls "nothing-but" materialism, combining in one view the theses that 
human persons are not merely bodies and that humans are entirely ma­
terial creatures. Throughout, Corcoran argues that the constitution view 
is consistent with essential Christian beliefs and that where it parts com­
pany with the bulk of the Christian tradition, the tradition's error can be 
explained and the departure can be defended. As a book that brings a
